

The Role of Third Side in Peace Talk:
Toward Effective Means of Dispute Resolution
The Case of the 1994 Nuclear Crisis between the United States and the DPRK

Chang I. Shin
Research Fellow
Program On Negotiation
Harvard Law School

Under the direction of Dr. William Ury
Director
Project on Preventing War
Program On Negotiation
Harvard Law School

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The United States very nearly blundered into war with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1994. Such destructive crisis could be resolved only by a last-minute deal brokered by former President Jimmy Carter who pulled both sides away from the brink. This case study is an analysis of the 1994 nuclear crisis between the United States and the DPRK from a third side perspective (Ury, 2000a; 2000b). The 1994 crisis is noteworthy in which both the United States and DPRK drove the crisis situation to the brink of war, instead of resolving conflict through bilateral talk and peaceful negotiation. The 1994 crisis could have been prevented if the United States had effective conflict management skills and cultural knowledge about the other side. Employing Ury's (2000) frame of "third side," this case study analyzes contextual dynamics of the 1994 crisis to explore effective means for the resolution of international dispute regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By examining socio-cultural factors involved in the escalation of international conflict, this study seeks to provide cultural knowledge as effective means of conflict management skills and a tool in resolving international dispute. This case study, from a third side perspective, answers for what Rosegrant and Watkins (1995) raised a "question mark" about the series of irrational behaviors of the DPRK. The third side perspective will provide an effective framework to resolve international dispute. In doing so, this case study seeks to explore effective means of dispute resolution to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapon and weapons of mass destruction¹ (WMD), and to contain peace in international community.

¹ WMD (weapons of mass destruction) refers to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that cause mass destruction of lives and peace.

On the Brink of “Sea of Fire”

The nuclear crisis of June 1994 was a turning point in American diplomacy with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In March 1994, tensions over the DPRK was continuing to escalate, prompting the United States to ship Patriot antimissile batteries to South Korea; the UN continuously urged Pyongyang to allow the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) inspect the DPRK’s suspected nuclear facilities. In response to such international pressure, a North Korean diplomat threatened South Korean counterparts that “all of Seoul will be engulfed by a deluge of fire” when war breaks out. Such intensified conflict was verbalized at an inter-Korean peace talk in the truce village at Panmunjom in late March. Reflecting such escalating conflict, the correspondence for Xinhua News Agency in Pyongyang reported on 23 March 1994 that:

A continued state of semi-war is in place inside North Korea. Pyongyang residents above junior high school level were ordered to carry bombshell sacks and military maps shoeing assigned missions. Civil air defense exercises were being conducted along with a blackout in the capital city of Pyongyang at night from march 16 to 17, but foreign embassies and foreigners’ apartments were exempted.²

The spring and summer of 1994 was the nail-biter days for the United States due to its nuclear crisis with the DPRK. Then-Secretary of Defense Perry was troubled because the American people did not know how close the nation has come to a war in 1994. North Korean officials were threatening to turn Seoul, the capital city of South Korea located in just 30 miles from the border of Demilitarized Zone, into a “sea of fire,” using hundreds of artillery batteries dug into tunnels along the Demilitarized Zone. In

² Gelston, S. (1994). Executive Briefing. *East Asia Executive Reports*, 16 (3), 15 March, 1994, 4.

responding to the DPRK's threat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were clamoring for a preemptive deployment of air, sea, and ground forces to the region to reinforce 37,000 forward-stationed U.S. troops.³ The Clinton administration was on the verge of dispatching military reinforcement to South Korea, a step that the American commander there believed could provoke a war.

Ironically, such a lethal international crisis between the United States and DPRK was mediated and resolved with the personal intervention of the former President Jimmy Carter. In the middle of such escalated conflict, Carter shocked the Clinton administration in early June of 1994: Kim Il Sung, the highest DPRK authority, personally invited Carter to intervene for the prompt resolution of the crisis. On 12 June 1994, Carter left for Pyongyang for his unofficial mission to resolve the nuclear conflict. Just days later, the so-called "Carter-Kim deal" shocked the Clinton administration and the world again. Carter obtained Kim Il Sung's personal pledge to freeze the DPRK's nuclear program and to allow the IAEA inspectors to monitor their nuclear facilities in exchange for high-level talks with the United States. Carter's personal meeting with Kim Il Sung, the "Great Leader," changed the dynamics of the crisis, leading the North Koreans to a negotiating table. Kim Il Sung reopened the possibility of diplomatic resolution by holding talks with Carter.⁴ Carter also announced that the presidents of North and South Korea, Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Sam, respectively, agreed on June 18, 1994 to hold a summit meeting centering on tensions over the DPRK's suspected weapons program.⁵

³ Kitfield, J. (1998). The next Korean conflict. *National Journal*, 30 (49), 2876-2878.

⁴ *New York Times*, June 21, 1994, A16.

⁵ *New York Times*, June 19, 1994, 11.

Following his visit to Pyongyang, Carter briefed the Clinton administration by saying that North Korea was ready for the first-ever summit with South Korea. Carter also pointed out the ineffectiveness of the United State's North Korea policy, warning that imposing sanction against North Korea because of its nuclear programs could provoke a war.⁶ On 22 June 1994, the Clinton administration sent a letter to the DPRK proposing resumption of high-level talks and offering suspension of economic sanctions against the DPRK once talks are under way.⁷ Recalling the 1994 crisis situation, one diplomat said, "We were so damned so close to a real confrontation."⁸

The Trajectory of the Nuclear Crisis between US-DPRK

The 1994 nuclear crisis between the United States and the DPRK was stemmed from the failure of bilateral talk between the International Atomic Energy Agency⁹ (IAEA) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the verification of suspected nuclear development. The DPRK signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but did not conclude a safeguard agreement with the IAEA until early 1992. During 26 January and 6 February 1993, bilateral talk between the IAEA and DPRK was held due to several inconsistencies identified during the sixth inspection of nuclear facilities in DPRK: One of the inconsistencies identified was that between the composition and quantity of plutonium the DPRK declared to the IAEA (obtained from melting fuel rods) and the IAEA's test results. The second discrepancy was between the

⁶ Greenberger, R., & Glain, S. (1994). Carter briefs White House on North Korea. *Wall Street Journal*. June 20, 1994, A6.

⁷ Gordon, M. (1994). Clinton offers North Korea a chance to resume talks. *New York Times*, June 22, 1994, A10.

⁸ Sigal, L. (1998). Jimmy Carter makes a deal. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 54 (1), 40-46.

⁹ The UN's nuclear watchdog that monitors compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory and liquid waste samples. Prior to the inspection, DPRK claimed that the latter inconsistency occurred when the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory.¹⁰

The situation of late 1993 was being deteriorated after intermittent talk between the IAEA and the DPRK had broken off. Instead of resuming talk, the IAEA then had referred the matter to the U. N. Security Council, where the United States was trying to get China's support for sanctions against the DPRK. Although the nuclear dispute was emerged because of the DPRK's non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the IAEA, it was escalated to the bilateral conflict between the United States and the DPRK. Both the United States and DPRK repeatedly insisted on their conflicting positions: The United States attempted to impose international sanctions on DPRK for blocking treaty-mandated inspections of its nuclear facilities, and DPRK argued that it would consider the sanction an act of war. The conflict situation was escalated with such different positions and cease of bilateral talk, which led the situation to a crisis, real confrontation between the United States and the DPRK.

Consequently, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the International Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993, citing the Article X provisions of the treaty that allow withdrawal for supreme national security considerations. As the bilateral relations deteriorated, the DPRK shocked the international community in mid May 1994 by announcing that it had begun to remove an

¹⁰ Letter and memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN

estimated 8,000 spent fuel rods from its 5 MW reactor in Yongbyon. The DPRK then announced that it would expel the IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the fuel to prevent its diversion for bomb production. Such escalated conflict was later verified by CIA Director James Woolsey on 18 July 1994, who stated that the fuel rods extracted from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon in June 1994 contained enough plutonium for DPRK to build about five nuclear bombs.¹¹

The escalation of the nuclear crisis

The nature of nuclear conflict between the US-DPRK rests on DPRK's unverified military capability to produce enough nuclear weapons, which the United States believed to threaten the stability of Asia-Pacific Region. Concern over the DPRK's nuclear capacity was increased in the late 1980s when the United States discovered evidence that North Korea had developed a nuclear weapons program centered at Yongbyon, the site of two early research reactors and a larger 5-megawatt reactor that became operational in 1986. The DPRK also had begun construction of a 50-megawatt reactor and was planning a 200-megawatt reactor, which was a gas-graphite model suited for the production of plutonium. In 1988, the United States intelligence detected construction of what it believed to be a plutonium separation plant at Yongbyon.¹²

However, the analysis of the 1994 nuclear crisis shows that the escalation of conflict is an interactive process. It also suggests that the DPRK's non-compliance to the NPT is not a unilateral but relational action. The first IAEA inspections took place in the

Security Council, United Nations Security Council Document, 17 March 1993, pp. 1-10.

¹¹ Frank Ching, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 14 July 1994, p. 32.

¹² Sigal, L. (1998). Jimmy Carter makes a deal. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 54 (1), 40-46.

summer of 1992, in which several anomalies were found: Isotopic analyses from glove box smears suggested the DPRK had processed an underdetermined amount of spent fuel on three separate occasions when the 5 megawatt reactor had been shut down. The IAEA demanded special inspections of nuclear waste sites and the DPRK refused and said that it would withdraw from the NPT. In response, Clinton took a hard-line position against the DPRK and announced in 7 November 1993 that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.”¹³ Clinton’s explicit announcement of such militant message changed the dynamics of on-going nuclear negotiation between the United States and DPRK. Responding to Clinton’s announcement, the DPRK flouted the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation it had signed in 1985, refusing to allow the IAEA inspectors to inspect the nuclear facilities.¹⁴

The relational dynamics among stakeholders

The evolution of dispute stories suggests that relational dynamics of stakeholders also played the key role in (de)escalating the conflict. Particularly, the role play of four parties, the DPRK, the United States, South Korea, and China, in the course of peace talk, was crucial in managing the international crisis. The DPRK joined the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) in 1974 and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985 under the pressure from the Soviet Union, in which the Soviet Union was supposed to continue assisting North Korea’s nuclear power program. However, after being an NPT signatory, DPRK refused to sign the IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement,

¹³ Sigal, L. (1998). Jimmy Carter makes a deal. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 54 (1), 40-46.

¹⁴ Far Eastern Review (March 31, 1994). Caught red-handed: Confronting Pyongyang is safer than appeasement, 157 (13), 5.

which was obligated to do within 18 months under the NPT provisions. The DPRK demanded three preconditions to sign the safeguards agreements: (1) U.S. must remove its nuclear weapons located in South Korea (2) the Team Spirit, the U.S.-South Korea annual military exercise, must be terminated (3) North Korea reserves the right to abrogate the safeguards agreement if it perceived that the nuclear power were acting in a hostile or suspicious manner toward the DPRK.¹⁵

Concern over the DPRK's refusal to sign the IAEA safeguard agreement and to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities increased in 1989. The U.S. intelligence report indicated that the DPRK was building what appeared to be additional reactors and possibly a nuclear fuel-repressing plan at its Yongbyon site, approximately 60 miles north of Pyongyang. It was believed that those facilities supplemented the 5 megawatt (MW) reactor, which the DPRK began constructing in 1980, that uses natural uranium for fuel readily available in the DPRK and believed to have become operational in 1986. Two additional reactors were developed in the mid 1980s, one of which was thought to be a 50 MW model that uranium fueled and capable of producing plutonium as is the 5 MW reactor; another 200 MW was under construction by the end of the 1980s. Based on such nuclear capacity, the United States' intelligence report indicated that the DPRK had developed the capacity to produce enough plutonium from its 5 MW reactor to construct one Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon each year.¹⁶

¹⁵ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea's nuclear program: The Clinton Administration's response. INSS Occasional Paper 3.

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Further, concern over the DPRK's nuclear weapon capabilities was realized during the Gulf War in 1991, when Iraq's nuclear program turned out to be far more advanced than U.S. intelligence agency had detected before the war. Iraq successfully fooled the U.S. intelligence agency, which raised concern over DPRK's nuclear capability, since it was turned out to be technically advanced and independent from outside assistance. Alarmed by such nuclear threat, a series of initiatives were made to make the Korean Peninsula be free of nuclear weapons. In January 1991 the two Koreas signed an agreement entitled the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prompted the DPRK to sign an agreement with the IAEA. It provided for international inspections of its nuclear facilities after ratification of the agreement by its legislature. In accordance with IAEA regulations, the DPRK provided the IAEA with detailed information about its seven nuclear facilities, including those at Yongbyon during May 1992. Between May 1992 and July 1993, the IAEA conducted seven ad hoc inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities.¹⁷

During this period of reconciliation, the DPRK had been cooperative with the IAEA regarding the inspection of suspected nuclear sites. It was noteworthy that the DPRK's reconciliatory gesture toward the IAEA's inspection was made only (1) when the DPRK had continued its bilateral talks with the United States and South Korean governments and; (2) when the United States and South Korean governments did not resume their annual military drills called Team Spirit, as the DPRK had demanded. Further reconciliatory move was also made when the United States and South Korean

¹⁷ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea's nuclear program: The Clinton Administration's response. INSS

government announced their intention to make the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear threat. For example, the DPRK's historic announcement to sign a pact establishing a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula was made on 14 January 1992, after the former presidents George Bush and Noh Tae Woo had announced on 6 January 1992 that they would cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercise, if North Korea would fulfill its obligation to the IAEA and South Korea's inspections of its nuclear facilities. On 20 January 1992, North and South signed the Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula to make the Korean Peninsula free of nuke. Such mutual effort of peace making also led US-North Korea high-level talk, which was resumed at UN in New York City to urge the DPRK permit the IAEA inspection. The resumption of the bilateral talk led the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguard agreement in 1992.¹⁸

The IAEA inspection process comprises four distinct phases: The first requires the DPRK to submit an official report of its existing nuclear facilities. The second phase requires the IAEA will conduct a series of ad hoc inspections to verify the development of nuclear program. The third phases requires that the DPRK and the IAEA will sign various subsidiary agreements and attachments to the accord describing inspection procedures for specific facilities. And the fourth phase requires that the IAEA will begin routine inspections designed to ensure that the nuclear facilities are not used for military purposes.¹⁹ On 14 February 1992, North and South agreed to form the JNCC by 19 March 1992 to oversee the mutual nuclear inspections, which was concluded an

Occasional Paper 3.

¹⁸ Mazarr, M. (1995). North Korea and the bomb: A case study in nonproliferation. New York: St. Marin's Press.

agreement to establish the JNCC and inspections of nuclear facilities in early-June 1992.²⁰

Ineffective skills to handle conflict with the DPRK

International prejudice and biased media report against the DPRK, however, cultured the nuclear threat within the international community. In early March 1992, there was a German press that the DPRK and Iran signed an agreement to jointly develop nuclear weapons.²¹ Shortly after the report, to ensure the DPRK's ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement, the US Secretary of State James A. Baker convinced Russia, South Korea, and Japan to agree to pressure North Korea in order to cease all nuclear weapons development.²² Meanwhile, on 16 March 1992 a Japanese press, quoting a 8 February 1992 KGB document, reported that the DPRK had developed a bomb at the Yongbyon plant more than a year ago, in which Kim Il-Sung is personally in charge of North Korea's nuclear program.

In dealing with crisis with the DPRK, United States demonstrated ineffective conflict management skills. On 18 March 1992, only two days after the Japanese media's report, the United States informed the DPRK that it would impose sanctions if they would not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities, in which the United States and South Korean government believed that the DPRK was delaying the inspection to move its nuclear facilities underground.²³ Despite increasing suspicion, North and

¹⁹ Mazarr, M. (1995). *North Korea and the bomb: A case study in nonproliferation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

²⁰ Sanger, D. (1992). *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 16 March 1992, 4.

²¹ Hibbs, M. (1992). *Nucleonics Week*, 6 August 1992, 13-14.

²² Seib, G. (1992). *Wall Street Journal*, 9 March 1992, A10.

²³ *Daily Telegraph* (London), 18 March 1992, A3.

South Korea conducted the first JNCC meeting to develop a specific plan for proposed mutual inspections of suspected nuclear weapons.²⁴

International pressure on the inspection of suspicious nuclear sites and the resumption of the annual US-South Korea joint military exercise, Team Spirit, negatively affected the process of peace talk. For example, North and South Korea failed to reach an agreement at the second JNCC meeting due to continuous international pressure during 1992. The meeting occurred after the IAEA Director General Hans Blix had informed North Korea on 1 April 1992 that if the DPRK would not declare its radiochemical facility, he would request the UN Security Council to demand special inspections of the site.²⁵ The joint meeting between North and South Korea came to a standstill during the sixth JNCC meeting when South Korea insisted that the DPRK's nuclear program is greater than ever contrary to their insistence of removal.²⁶ On 16 September 1992, the IAEA Director General Hans Blix announced that the DPRK agreed to allow the IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities.²⁷ On 12 November 1992, The DPRK repeatedly warned that US-South Korea Team Spirit military exercises could create obstacles to future international inspections of the DPRK nuclear facilities.

Ineffective strategies to negotiate with the DPRK

Progress made between 1992 and 1993 was dramatically changed as the transition from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration took place in January 1993. At the same time, Kim Young Sam's new administration, succeeding Noh administration,

²⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 March 1992, 9-10.

²⁵ Maclachlan, A. (1992). *Nucleonics Week*, 7 May 1992, 8-9.

²⁶ Kaplan, J. (1993). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 March 1993.

²⁷ Yonhap (Seoul), 19 September 1992.

approached the DPRK with its hard-line policy. Kim's approach was quite different from the previous successor Noh Tae Woo, whose administration had contributed to defrosting relationship with the DPRK through continuous bilateral contact and other means of intergovernmental communication channels to promote inter-Korean dialogue. Such power transition and differences in North Korea policy were manifest in ways in which both Clinton and Kim administrations approached to the DPRK's nuclear programs and responded to their unpredictable negotiating behaviors.

Such instability during the power transition of the United States and South Korea administrations negatively affected the dynamics of peace talk. Between May-November 1992, the IAEA noticed discrepancies concerning the amount of plutonium the DPRK was admitting to extracting. Between 2-14 November 1992, IAEA found indisputable evidence that the DPRK had covered up a nuclear waste facility in Youngbyon and requested permission for inspection. In response, the DPRK argued that an IAEA inspector "an agent of CIA" blaming the inspector getting "instructions from the US State Department."²⁸ On 19 November 1992, South Korean president Noh Tae Woo and Russia President Boris Yeltsin agreed that the DPRK's nuclear weapon program is not "desirable for peace and security," promising to work together to encourage the DPRK to adopt openness and reform.²⁹ Finally, during the eleventh JNCC meeting, inter-Korean dialogue collapsed. In early February 1993, the IAEA inspectors requested permission to conduct "special inspection" of two additional sites that the agency suspected of being storage sites for nuclear waste, whereas the DPRK denied these two facilities were not wastes

²⁸ Oberdorfer, D. (1997). *The two Koreas: A contemporary history*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

sites but military warehouse. An impasse developed between the IAEA and the DPRK in February 1993 with the DPRK, in which the DPRK blame the IAEA's inspection attempt simply a "U.S. tool" to place increased pressure on their country.

Where talks do not exist, negotiation fails.

Due to the disagreement between the IAEA and the DPRK on nuclear inspections, tension was growing and situation was being deteriorated by the cease of bilateral talk between two Koreas on the denuclearization process. The IAEA referred the DPRK's refusal to the UN Security Council, in which it voted 13-0 to adopt a resolution on the DPRK in May 1993 to allow the IAEA inspectors access to the two suspected waste sites, whereas China and Pakistan abstained. The DPRK responded that such pressure is "an interference in the internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty." On 14 March 1993, the DPRK announced that it intended to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the conclusion of the 90-days notification period as required by the NPT.³⁰ In response to the DPRK's action, the Clinton administration responded to the DPRK's response with the threat of economic sanction while mobilizing international community to place harsher pressure on the DPRK. Rather than attempting to hold peace talks by accepting or considering what the DPRK was demanding, the United States declined their offer and closed intergovernmental communication channels.

The escalation of destructive conflict could be resolved only with the personal involvement of Carter; none of governmental (or non-governmental) efforts was made to

²⁹ Pollack, A. (1992). *New York Times*, 21 November 1992, 4.

³⁰ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea's nuclear program: The Clinton Administration's response. INSS Occasional Paper 3.

resolve the crisis. The last minute peace-deal was made by Carter's personal mediation of the crisis despite the opposition from the Clinton administration. Carter could persuade the DPRK's top leader, Kim Il Sung, to freeze the production of advanced nuclear weapons. Carter's first visit to DPRK took place on 15 June 1994, when the conflict situation was being deteriorated with the DPRK's announcement that would expel the IAEA inspectors until a deal would be worked out in a third round of talks with the United States. Carter, while satisfying what the DPRK demanded for a third round high-level talk, could get acceptance from Kim Il Sung. Kim assured Carter that he would freeze their nuclear program during the talk and would consider a permanent freeze if their aged reactors could be replaced with modern and safer ones along with one condition that the United States would guarantee that there would be no nuclear attack against his country.³¹ At the Carter-Kim deal, Kim Il Sung made clear that they would willingly trade their nuclear capacity with economic and financial assistance from the United States. The 1994 crisis was thus finally resolved with the personal intervention of Carter. However, the origin of conflict was never resolved nor eliminated, which was later haunted in the 1998 missile crisis.

The Analysis of the 1994 Crisis from a Third Side Perspective

A third-side perspective focuses on multiple roles of a *community* within which conflict can be transformed into peace through constructive dialogue and negotiation. According to Ury, "third side is the surrounding community, which serves as a *container* for any escalating conflict," since every conflict occurs within a community that

³¹ Such "want" of the DPRK was included as a conditional provision in the 1994 Agreed Framework.

constitutes the third side of any dispute.³² Ury also proposes that the third side can take multiple roles to contain conflict: To prevent conflict, we can take three main preventive roles of the third side as a provider, teacher, and the bridge-builder; to resolve overt conflict, we can take the roles of mediator, arbiter, equalizer, and healer; to contain any escalating power struggle, we can take the roles of witness, referee, and peacekeeper.

The third side is a self-organizing community to create peace. Ury proposes that “third side is the community itself taking responsibility for its own conflicts.”³³ Whereas a mediator can only be an “outside neutral” in resolving conflict, a “third side” can take multiple roles by preventing, resolving, and containing conflict as insiders or outsider third side. Ury also articulates that the “insider third side” is the community of family, friends, or disputing parties themselves, whereas “outsider third sides” are neighbors, neutrals, or bystanders.³⁴ For example, relational dynamics among stakeholders involving in the DPRK’s nuclear crisis shows that “insider third sides” were South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia maintaining friendship as well as constituting the neighboring community of the DPRK. The United States, Russia, and Pakistan were technically “outsiders,” along with the IAEA and UN Security Council who were supposed to take the roles of “neutrals”; however, all of them could have been insider third sides as well.

As a “very insider” of the conflict, South Korea’s role was crucial in the conflict situation. Although South Korea could have deescalated the conflict by taking the role of “bridge-builder” between the United States and the DPRK, South Korea government

³² Ury, W. (2000a). *Third side*. New York: Penguin. p. 7.

³³ Ury, W. (2000b). *Third side science: Exploration of conflict and reconciliation*. Cambridge, Harvard Law School: PON Books, p. 90.

³⁴ Ury, W. (2000a). *Third side*. New York: Penguin.

demonstrated political vacillation in dealing with the crisis. The position of South Korea³⁵ toward the DPRK was that it did not want a war on the Korean Peninsula nor did it want the economic collapse of the DPRK. South Korea, at the same, did not want to be isolated or non-participant in the negotiation processes between the United States and the DPRK. Such political dilemma was surfaced even after when the 1994 crisis was resolved. The indecisiveness of South Korean government contributed to the escalation of conflict. South Korea, despite its crucial role, took side with the United States while defining the DPRK as a common enemy. South Korean government collaborated with the United States by jointly holding the Team Spirit Exercise, the annual military joint practice, with the United States, which hampered the inter-Korean talk.

However, such leverage for peace talk was not effective in negotiating with the DPRK. Further, South Korean government's political vacillation and indecisive North Korea policy intensified the tensions between United States and the DPRK. Rather than bridging the "conceptual gap" between the United States and the DPRK, South Korea's taking side with the United States intensified the conflict situation further provoking the DPRK's irrationality. On 1 April 1994, South Korea's foreign minister Han Sung-Joo, after meeting with the United States Secretary of State William Perry, said that the United States and the South Korea would delay their decision of whether to conduct the Team Spirit Exercise to give the DPRK sufficient time to respond to the UN Security Council's statement. The UN statement was issued on 31 March 1994, which requested the DPRK's prompt response to the IAEA's inspections of their suspected nuclear

³⁵ Referring Kim Young Sam administration during the crisis situation.

plants.³⁶ South Korea, shortly after, issued a statement announcing that they would resume the Team Spirit military exercise that would take place in November 1994, if the DPRK would persist rejecting IAEA inspections. In supporting South Korea's position, Perry again warned the DPRK on 22 April 1994, following his trip to Seoul, that the United States would request the UN sanctions along with Japan and South Korea to "seek a way of imposing some sort of multinational sanctions against the DPRK."³⁷ Han and Perry's public announcement of the inevitability of UN sanctions thus led the conflict situation to what he called "a very near-term crisis."³⁸

The analysis of multiple roles of third side in the 1994 crisis

The trajectory of the 1994 crisis shows that it could have been prevented if appropriate roles of third side would be properly activated before it was escalated to a crisis. Although the crisis stemmed from the DPRK's non-compliance to the NPT, the United States' inadequate handling of the situation led the conflict into a crisis. Despite the critical role of the United States resolving the international dispute, it failed in maintaining its role as a peace-container to preserve peace in international community. Despite the missing role of the United States, several third side roles were self-organized and displayed within the international community in an attempt to deescalate the conflict and to contain power struggle between the United States and the DPRK.

To facilitate the DPRK's compliance with the NPT, the IAEA and the UN Security Council played roles of "arbiter" to enforce international rules and law, while

³⁶ Los Angeles Times, 2 April 1994, A10.

³⁷ Washington Post, 23 April 1994.

³⁸ New York Times, 16 May 1994, A3.

US Security Council intervened the dispute between the IAEA and the DPRK as mediator. The role of the IAEA is a “referee” to witness any violation of international agreement on the non-proliferation. However, the manner in which the UN Security Council handled the conflict situation and skills used in the crisis situation were not effective to deal with the DPRK. Despite China’s objection to the use of economic sanction as means to enforce the international law, UN Security Council continuously forced the DPRK to allow the IAEA’s inspection rather than facilitating continuous peace talk between the IAEA and the DPRK. Although UN Security Council was expected to take an arbiter role in resolving the international dispute as a supranational organization, it lost neutrality by taking the side of IAEA. UN Security Council’s expected role as an “internationally-approved-arbiter” was not played even when the conflict was escalated to a crisis between the United States and the DPRK.

In such complexity of relationship, Russia took the role of “equalizer,” in which it attempted to take the role of a bridge-builder to equalize power relationships between the United States and DPRK. Russia also took the role of a “referee” attempting to deescalate the conflict in order to promote peace and stability. Contrary to the reports of Western media, Russia publicized that the DPRK would not have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons but use the suspicions of “they have” such capacity as a bargaining chip. Russia tended to be neutral, while abstaining from intervening or mediating the dispute between the United States and the DPRK. Although Russia proposed to resolve the dispute in a world conference at UN, the DPRK refused such offer saying that the nuclear inspection

dispute should be settled in direct talk with the United States.³⁹ Russia also supported Clinton's decision to impose economic sanctions to make the DPRK halt further nuclear production. In June 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev told Secretary of State Christopher that Russia would support the United States' decision of imposing economic sanctions against the DPRK.⁴⁰

The role of Japan was crucial due to its hostile relationship with the DPRK. Contrary to Russia, Japan took a role of "bystander," intensifying the tension rather than attempting to deescalate the conflict. Japan's role in the nuclear crisis is noteworthy to consider its sensitive security concern against the DPRK's nuclear facility. Japan used to facilitate tension by distributing news regularly to the international community that the DPRK would have the nuclear capacity. It was Japan that first announced that the DPRK was extracting 16-24kg of plutonium from the nuclear facility at Yongbyon.⁴¹ Japan also took the same position with the United States about their relationship with the DPRK. On 12 March 1993, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa expressed concern over the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT and reiterated Japan's policy that relations with the DPRK can not be normalized until they allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.⁴² Japan, same day, released another news based on its intelligence

³⁹ Reuter, 1 April 1994.

⁴⁰ Such position was also confirmed by the Russian Ambassador in Seoul, Georgy Kunadze, who made similar statement in February and April 1994.

⁴¹ Based on the Japanese Foreign Ministry sources, as reported by Kyodo (Tokyo) on 10 March 1993 about the development of nuclear facility at Yongbyon.

⁴² *Kyoto* (Tokyo), 12 March 1993.

source that the DPRK appeared to extract between 35-50 pounds of plutonium from its facility at Yongbyon.⁴³

Japan also created coalition with Russia to prevent the DPRK from producing further nuclear weapons. Regarding means of negotiation, Japan collaborated with Russia in supporting the use of sanctions against the DPRK. On October 1993, Russia and Japan issued a joint statement that included a reference to the DPRK nuclear program, in which both called for the DPRK to remain in the NPT and to comply fully with the IAEA safeguard inspections.⁴⁴ The DPRK was upset about Japan's support for imposing economic sanctions over the DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons program. Shortly after, the Japanese weekly *Sukan Bunsun*, citing a confidential Russian General Staff report, alleged that the DPRK succeeded in creating one or two nuclear warheads, accumulated 10-12 kg of uranium-235 and 320 kg of plutonium-239. The newspaper also argued that Russia had worked with the DPRK for the development of further nuclear weapons.⁴⁵ Japan's such position provoked the DPRK intensifying the tensions further: the DPRK threatened war against Japan, if Japan would join the United States and South Korea in facing down Pyongyang.⁴⁶ Despite such warning, South Korea, Japan, and the United States continued forcing and pressing the DPRK to allow the IAEA's inspection, which was ineffective to get concession from the DPRK.

Under such complicated relational dynamics, the role of China was crucial in deescalating the conflict. China, as a "provider" or "teacher," sought to provide

⁴³ Gus Constantine, *Washington Post*, 12 March 1993, A1.

⁴⁴ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea's nuclear program: The Clinton Administration's response. INSS Occasional Paper 3.

⁴⁵ Sergey Agafonov, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 27 January 1994, pp. 1, 4.

knowledge about the need of the DPRK, while supporting financial and humanitarian aids to the DPRK. China also tried to mediate the dispute by publicizing that the hard-line approach of the United States and international community would not be effective to persuade the DPRK. Particularly, China urged the United States and members of the international community that they should resolve the crisis through dialogue. China opposed to the United States' use of economic sanction against the DPRK, while providing the United States with cultural knowledge about how to deal with the DPRK. However, most members of the international community did not accept what China recommended to resolve the crisis. Although China tended to be neutral by announcing that China did not want nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, it also opposed the introduction of harsh measurement against the DPRK, implying that such means of law enforcement would not be effective dealing with the crisis with the DPRK. Meanwhile, China took the role of “teacher” for the DPRK by guiding them that the proliferation of nuclear weapon in the Korean Peninsula would not be a good idea.

For example, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin made their policy position clear at a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Mirohiro Hosokawa in November 1993 in Seattle. Ziang made clear that China really had very little influence to exert over the DPRK and should not be replied upon to moderate their behavior. Ziang also expressed his same position to the South Korean President Kim Yong Sam that he supported a denuclearized Korean Peninsula but it should be accomplished through inter-Korean talks, negotiations with the IAEA, and bilateral efforts between the United States and the

⁴⁶ Hamilton, D. (1994). North Korea threatens war against Japan. *Wall Street Journal*. 10 June 1994, A6.

DPRK rather than through economic sanctions. Because of the China's neutral position or trepidation on the use of economic sanction or international pressure as means of non-proliferation, the United States and the UN Security Council compromised their resolution by urging the DPRK for their cooperation with the IAEA.⁴⁷ As a result, China did not take an explicit role of "mediator" but played a critical role in reducing tensions with their subtle neutrality different from that of Russia.

More importantly, the United States and Japan's decision to impose economic sanctions against the DPRK greatly contributed to the escalation of the conflict, although there was enough time for a dialogue. Particularly, the use of economic sanction card to get concession from the other side, who was in the most financial deficiency, did not produce any effect or desirable outcome that the United States and Japan sought. On 10 June 1994, the United States prepared its position to the UN Security Council on sanctions against the DPRK, which involves two phases: The first phase will involve preventing the flow of money from North Koreans living abroad to their families in North Korea, stopping arms sales to North Korea, and terminating North Korea's reliance on the United Nations for economic and nuclear cooperation. Chinese President Ziang Zemin said that the use of sanctions against the DPRK would be unnecessary "sine there is still room for dialogue." Japan also offered its own three-stage plan: "a warning, sanctions on arms sales and technical cooperation, and then sanctions that include financial remittances," whereas Russia proposed an international conference to resolve

⁴⁷ Berry, W. (1995).

the matter.⁴⁸ Three days later, the DPRK submitted a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.⁴⁹ Regarding the DPRK's announcement, South Korean government accused the DPRK that whose "ultimate aim is to develop nuclear weapons and that is employing delaying tactics to earn time."⁵⁰ Instead of attempting to deescalate the conflict, South Korean government intensified the conflict even worse terrifying the situation with the series of public announcement of possibility of further bomb production and estimated nuclear development in the DPRK.⁵¹

The dilemma of mobilizing international community

The significance of the 1994 crisis rests on the fact that the escalation of conflict could have ended up with a war. The 1994 nuclear crisis proved that all members of international community were third sides, in which no parties would serve as "bystanders" because of the complexity and interdependency of the crisis. The United Nation or international community itself could have been third sides, rather than merely "bystanders" or "neutrals." Either of the international organizations also could resolve or contain the overt US-DPRK conflict, if they could have been mobilized to prevent the crisis before it was escalated into destructive crisis. The 1994 nuclear crisis taught all members of international community that conflict is not only a consequence of hostile relationship but also process of relationship, in which relational dynamics could prevent,

⁴⁸ Washington Times, 11 June 1994, A, A4.

⁴⁹ According to the IAEA, any membership countries can withdraw from the agreement.

⁵⁰ Remarks by Kim Deok, Director of South Korea's Agency for National Security Planning on 13 June 1994, reported by *Reuters*, 13 June 1994. I would argue that any conflict is hyper-real, which can be deconstructed via constructive dialogue.

⁵¹ Refers to South Korea's defense minister Yi Pyong-tae's remarks, who reveals that there are indications that the DPRK is testing nuclear bomb denotations, which shows that they have developed at least an elementary stage of a nuclear device, reported by KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul) on 15 June 1994.

resolve, and contain any conflict if all members could realize that any conflict is relational and interactive.

Significance lies in the fact that no mechanism of self-mobilization within the community to prevent the escalation of conflict was found. Further, none of effective conflict management skills were adopted to deal with the DPRK, although China continuously argued that imposing economic sanctions would not be effective to resolve the crisis. For example, the IAEA and the United Nation Security Council continuously pressed the DPRK to allow the inspection of several suspected nuclear sites. The IAEA, particularly, faced down the DPRK with public derision of their collective criminality and unilateral notification of subsequent punishment against their non-compliant conduct. The IAEA also rashly concluded that the DPRK is “no longer in compliance with IAEA safeguards”⁵² even before attempting to resume another round of peace talk. The United States, further, intensified the conflict by publicly threatening that it would impose an economic sanction if the DPRK continued developing nuclear weapons. Although the DPRK responded that imposing sanction would be considered a declaration of war, the voice of the other side was not heard but ignored.

In line with China, Carter also took the role of “teacher” by providing knowledge about the DPRK. Although such international pressure was not effective to persuade North Koreans as Carter pointed out, none of the parties in the international community would listen to Carter’s advice and policy change. Further, none of the parties indicated their intention of negotiating conflict with the DPRK, although the DPRK made clear of

⁵² Washington Post, 1 June 1994.

their intention of negotiating with the United States. More importantly, the United States did not realize its expected role as a “neutral” to maintain world peace; the United States did not know how to mobilize the international community. Rather than mediating or facilitating resolution of the inspection dispute between the IAEA and the DPRK, the United States handled the situation in an ineffective way by mobilizing itself as a major disputing side, taking place of the IAEA. Under the direction of the United States, all “possible third sides” were mobilized against the DPRK to place international pressure in order to make them give up the development of nuclear weapons. Such negotiation strategy did not work for the DPRK but only escalated the conflict to a crisis.

The consequence of ignoring the other side’s voice was disastrous in negotiating the nuclear conflict. Although the DPRK had expressed their intention to trade off their nuclear weapon with the normalization of relationship with the United States, the Clinton administration did not listen what the DPRK was demanding. Instead, the United States insisted and imposed what the United States want the DPRK to do not even attempting to negotiate with the DPRK over its divergent interests regarding the nuclear development. The United States responded to the DPRK’s need by shutting off all intergovernmental channels and denying further high-level talk. Intergovernmental talks were finally resumed after Carter had received personal pledge from Kim Il Sung that they would freeze their nuclear development program in exchange for the high-level talks to normalize their relationship with the United States.

Problem lies in the fact that the United States did not have any intention of negotiating their conflict nor normalizing their relationship with the DPRK. Further, the

United States not only did not know how to address their concern with the DPRK but also how to catch conflict as early as possible before it was escalated to a lethal crisis. The IAEA, as an international organization, also did not know how to address the tensions with the DPRK. The IAEA forced the DPRK to allow the unilateral inspection without offering any reward. Further, the IAEA did not know how to mobilize itself as an “insider third side.” The IAEA could have engaged in high-level talk and resumed bilateral talk with the DPRK. Rather than resolving conflict with the DPRK through constructive means such as peaceful dialogue or negotiation, the IAEA referred the case to the United Nation Security Council, which provoked the DPRK to withdraw from the international non-proliferation treaty. The DPRK criticized the IAEA’s decision charging that the UN Security Council only serves for the interests of the United States, rather than working as an independent international organization to resolve international conflict.

The missing third side roles in the 1994 crisis

The ways in which the 1994 nuclear conflict was resolved is unique for its lack of third side roles within the international community. It is also noteworthy that such lethal crisis was resolved with the mediation of Carter, although there were many neighboring countries and international organizations, such as IAEA or UN Security Council. South Korea, as the closest neighboring “inside” party to the DPRK, facilitated the nuclear impasse with its ineffective approach, instead of trying to address their frustrated needs to the United States and the members of international community in behalf of the DPRK. Within the international community, few roles were played who could take the roles as witness, referee, or peacekeeper to resolve the conflict before such overt conflict reached

to a crisis of power struggle. Particularly, the role of witness who could pay close attention to signs of escalating tension was not played. Both the IAEA and UN Security Council, as witness or referee, failed in maintaining peace and negotiating incompatible interests with the DPRK.

“Insider third side” was not mobilized to contain power struggle between the United States and the DPRK. South Korea, as a very- inner-third side, was not effective dealing with the conflict. South Korean government either did not act as a referee or witness to contain power struggle between the United States and the DPRK. Not recognizing the real intention of the DPRK was disastrous negotiating their divergent interests with the DPRK. Without any consistent “North Korea Policy,” Kim Young Sam administration inadequately approached the DPRK with its inconsistent and indecisive ways of negotiation. In line with Kim’s administration, Japan, as a close neighboring neighbor to both North and South Korea, who could witness peace-making process, facilitated intensified the tension rather than trying to deescalate the conflict. Japan, even in the course of peace talk, further intensified conflict by disseminating unverified news source regarding the DPRK’s suspicious nuclear weapon program and avoiding its involvement in direct bilateral peace talk with the DPRK.⁵³

There was no explicit role of a “referee” who could be influential in resolving the escalated conflict, although Russia attempted to take the role. China maintained its position neutral while refraining from intervening the conflict situation, although China attempted to persuade the DPRK not to engage in further stage of nuclear program. Most

of all, the United States failed in maintaining its role as a peacekeeper as the Superpower by engaging in a destructive conflict as a major disputant. The United States' inadequate dealing of the crisis demonstrates that the United States, as an "insider third side" of the nuclear dispute with the DPRK, did not know how to negotiate their needs with the other side because of discrimination against the DPRK. The intervention of the United States to international dispute between the IAEA and the DPRK was blamed by the DPRK. The DPRK accused the IAEA of the "U.S. tool" to intervene their domestic politics thus violating the right of sovereignty.

Consequences of Missing Roles of Third Sides

The expected role of the United States is a peacekeeper to initiate peace talk and mobilize the international community to construct peace. However, the role of the United States during the 1994 crisis was in question for its ineffective handling of the conflict with the DPRK, inappropriate skills to manage the nuclear crisis, and incompetent knowledge about the other side. Although the United States should not have involved in such crisis as a disputing side, it involved in the conflict situation as the major disputing side of the crisis. The case of 1994 nuclear crisis suggests that the United States consider an effective means to maximize its military and security interests in Asian-Pacific region. It also suggests that the process of peace talk be inclusive and constructive, while facilitating open dialogue, rather than disclosing a talk.

⁵³ The DPRK realized the role of Japan in the 1994 crisis, with which Japan became a real target of the DPRK's missile attack in the 1998 crisis.

The role of “Jimmy Carter” in resolving the 1994 crisis

The 1994 nuclear crisis demonstrates that the DPRK used the nuclear weapon as a negotiation leverage to be treated as an equal partner with the United States.⁵⁴ Because of their frustrated needs and wants, in which the DPRK desired to normalize relationships with the United States, there were no other alternatives left but to resist to the imposed international pressure. Furthermore, without any explicit third sides of members of the international community, there was only one option left for both parties to choose: war, as the ultimate means to resolve crisis. Amidst the escalated conflict, the role of Carter played in the crisis situation was multiple-folded. As a “meta-mediator,” Carter played as a mediator, arbiter, and healer of the conflicting relationship by voicing the other side. Carter’s successful resolution of the nuclear impasse demonstrated that “good faith talk” did produce peaceful outcome in resolving conflict with the DPRK than any other threatening tactics or hard positional bargaining strategies.

With the missing roles of third sides, the resolution of 1994 nuclear crisis was Carter’s personal accomplishment by defusing the nuclear crisis with the DPRK. The role of Carter in the 1994 crisis was not only a third-party mediator but also an equalizer of asymmetrical power relationship between the United States and the DPRK. After resolving the nuclear crises, Carter argued that the Clinton administration’s hard-line policy toward the DPRK would not be effective to freeze their nuclear development. Carter also stressed the importance of mutual respect and understanding by personally engaging himself in, what Clinton said, the “scarcest place on earth.” Carter’s inclusive

negotiation strategy was contrasted with that of Clinton, who had excluded the DPRK from the process of peace talk.

Carter, however, had to deal with opposition from the conservatives and internal power conflict with the Clinton administration as well. Before Carter left for Pyongyang, some skeptical views criticized his trip to the DPRK as “disastrous escapade”⁵⁵ of Mr. Carter as “a private citizen.”⁵⁶ Even after his successful resolution of the nuclear crisis, some argued that Jimmy Carter’s role in peace keeping efforts in the 1995 crises does “deserve no medal”⁵⁷ since he had compromised the United States’ interests and made President Clinton look totally ineffective and irrelevant. Interpersonal struggle between Carter and Clinton was also manifest in the ways in which the Clinton administration approached to the crisis to dominate power over foreign policy.

Carter also faced widespread skepticism in the Clinton administration that believed the DPRK would not freeze their nuclear weapon development project as they promised nor comply with the international agreement.⁵⁸ Carter, despite the accomplishment of his “freelance diplomacy,” had not been acknowledged by Clinton, whose international leadership was disapproved by more than 60% of public for his foreign policy failure in North Korea and Haiti.⁵⁹ Contrary to these critic, Carter resolved the 1994 nuclear crisis and obtained the DPRK’s agreement on the conditions of non-

⁵⁴ Such “need” of the DPRK is manifested in their political ideology called *juche* (being self-reliant or subjectivity of being).

⁵⁵ Schwartz, H. (1994). Don’t fall for Korean ploy. *USA Today*, June 20, 1994, A14.

⁵⁶ Asia: War or peace for Korea? *The Economist*, 331 (7868), 18 June, 1994, 37.

⁵⁷ Chavez, L. (1994). Carter’s meddling deserves no medal. *USA Today*, Dec. 28, 1994, A9.

⁵⁸ Sanger, D. (1994). Carter visit to North Korea: whose trip was it really? *New York Times*, June 18, 1994, A6.

⁵⁹ Kirschten, D. (1994). Traded but raising in the polls. *National Journal*, 26 (41), 2372.

proliferation, which was embodied in the 1994 Agreed Framework signed between the DPRK and the United States on 25 February 1994. The resolution of the 1994 nuclear crisis was indeed a personal achievement of Carter, which intensified power struggle with Clinton over North Korea policy. Such interpersonal conflict later delayed the prompt implementation of the provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The Carter lesson: The creation of meaning in dispute resolution

Carter's visit of the DPRK was more than a purposeful trip to resolve conflict. Rather, his visit, as the former president of the United States, to the DPRK, the most "isolated and scared place on earth,"⁶⁰ was symbolic and meaningful for the DPRK. Carter's visit with his wife⁶¹ was also rhetorical sending the DPRK messages that their visit was to bring peace to the DPRK with personal care and attention. Particularly, Carter's self-presentational mission as the corrector of Clinton's "irreducible mistake" was an effective means of *healing* the conflicting relationship between the United States and the DPRK. Therefore, what was exchanged between Carter and Kim Il Sung was trust and hope for cooperation to normalize relationship, which was the most powerful persuasion. Such built-in trust thus resulted in full verification of their suspected nuclear sites, which could not be verified with the forceful verification demand of the IAEA or threat of economic sanctions of the United States.

Trust-based talk not only resolved the crisis but also guaranteed the DPRK's commitment to freeze its further development of nuclear program. Accommodating the

⁶⁰ Clinton, W. (1993). From his speech delivered in his first trip to South Korea.

⁶¹ Which should be confirmed later by interviewing him. The author analyzes this Carter's decision as a careful consideration of the situation given his conflict with the Clinton administration over his authority and representational power.

other side's financial needs also produced desirable outcomes in that the DPRK pledged for full verification and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. More importantly, Carter's public disapproval of Clinton's hard-line policy against the DPRK⁶² constructed a meaning diverting the nuclear impasse to resolution. It also saved the public face of Kim Il Sung, whose face with absolute power had been down by Clinton's harsh rhetoric. The 1994 nuclear crisis demonstrates that resolution of any international dispute depends on mutual effort to create joint gain. It also shows that peace is a mutual construct that can be *cultured* with mutual effort to construct peace with effective means of dispute resolution.

The cultural identity of Carter mattered in dispute resolution

In addition to mutual respect, Carter's cultural identity as an "old-former-US-President" played the critical role in resolving the nuclear impasse. Carter's identity was particularly important to the DPRK where Carter's identity was perceived as an "American respect," since seniority and status are a-must-requirement for credibility to deal with such national security-concerned issues in DPRK. Realizing the importance of "who is going to do business with the DPRK," Carter contacted the Clinton administration when the conflict was being escalated. On 1 June 1994, Carter called Clinton to express his concern about the nuclear crises with the DPRK. Clinton arranged for Robert Gallucci to go to Carter's home in Georgia to brief the former president on the history of the diplomatic effort in some detail. After receiving Gallucci's briefing, Carter wrote a letter to Clinton as follows:

To North Korea, which had just been denied a meeting with an assistant secretary of state, a visit by a former president, especially one who had tried to ease

⁶² Referring to Carter's interview with CNN.

tensions on the Korean Peninsula when he was in office, was a token of American respect. Carter was someone Kim Il Sung could do business with.⁶³

The Clinton administration was hesitant in accepting Carter's offer since his "freelance diplomacy" might undermine the authority of the Clinton administration and highlight the ineffectiveness of its foreign policy. Carter met Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser and Daniel Poneman, National Security Council staff member, to make clear that the role of Carter was not to offer the DPRK a new American policy without any official authority nor endorsement about his visit to the DPRK. Carter also received long briefing from Gallucci about details of technical issues to clarify different views on what was permitted under the nonproliferation treaty and what was not, and how much plutonium the DPRK may have reprocessed in the past or curtailing its current nuclear program. Carter was troubled since he knew that how the United States' sanction could be interpreted as a warning by the DPRK and how they would react to such overt statements that prohibit further development of the existing nuclear program.⁶⁴

Clinton's "irreducible mistake" or miscalculation about the "North Korea cards" is rooted in his lack of cultural knowledge about the DPRK and his failure of not accepting advice from his international colleague. Kim Dae Jung, the present president and the former leader of opposite party of South Korea, warned that the United States should take the three different perspectives in approaching the DPRK. Referring his previous speech delivered to U.S. Congress in May 1994, Kim Dae Jung reiterated the causes of the nuclear crisis:

⁶³ Sigal, L. (1998). Jimmy Carter makes a deal. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 54 (1), 40-46.

First, North Korea's objective was not to develop nuclear weapons, but to use its nuclear program to obtain diplomatic normalization with the United States. Second, therefore, a successful resolution of the impasse required a "package deal" consisting of a simultaneous exchange of a diplomatic concession by the U.S. and guarantee of nuclear transparency by the North. Third, North Korea was a society where Kim Il Sung exercised absolute power and, therefore, the United States had to deal with him directly to resolve the nuclear deadlock. I suggested that President Clinton send to Pyongyang a respected elder states man, such as Jimmy Carter, who had the credibility and prestige to deal with Kim Il Sung.

As Kim Dae Jung pointed out, the "identity" of negotiator was effective as an alternative means of dispute resolution with the DPRK. Clinton should have considered the mechanisms of *culture*, in which conflict is escalated when certain norms or codes are being violated within such system. Clinton also should have considered the role of cultural expectation, in which certain elements of expectation constitute credibility of a mediator or negotiator who could do business with the DPRK. Clinton also should have considered DJ's advice why only does an "elder-men-with-high-authority" work in resolving dispute with the DPRK. Therefore, sending middle-ranked or working-level diplomats to the DPRK was not effective in resuming a peace talk nor resolving conflict. Further, refusal of a meeting with Robert Gallucci, then-"Assistant Secretary" who were in his mid-40s, was a disaster that led the conflict situation to an irresolvable impasse. Carter's successful resolution of the 1994 nuclear impasse, thus, proved that cultural identity of a negotiator does matter in resolving conflict with the DPRK and does affect the dynamics of negotiation and outcome as well. Carter's peaceful resolution of the crisis also raised a question about the effective means for disarmament negotiation: The

⁶⁴ Sigal, L. (1998). Jimmy Carter makes a deal. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Jan/Feb. 1998.

United States government had coerced the DPRK for three years to persuade them giving-up their nuclear weapons, whereas Carter only took three days of personal visit.

The alternative effective means: Saving “face” of the Other

The Clinton administration was shocked at the news that Carter made a deal with Kim Il Sung that the DPRK would freeze his nuclear program under IAEA monitoring and to resume high-level talks on a comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issues, which was announced on CNN news. Carter mentioned at CNN interview that “the commitment that I have received is that all aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program would be resolved through good-faith talk” with the DPRK not by letting the IAEA conduct a special inspection of the waste sites.” More importantly, Carter publicly repudiated the sanction strategy of the Clinton administration by saying that:

The reason I came over here as to prevent an irreconcilable mistake....It was obvious that the threat of sanctions had no effect on them whatsoever, except as a pending insult, branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and their revered leader as a liar and criminal.⁶⁵

The “Carter-Kim deal” was finalized in the form of an Agreed Framework in 1994. Finally, the United States and the DPRK concluded four-months of negotiations⁶⁶ by signing the “Agreed Framework” in Geneva on 21 October 1994. The Agreed Framework established a three-stage process for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. To resolve the United States’ concerns about the DPRK’s plutonium-producing reactors and Yongbyon reprocessing facility, the agreement called for the

⁶⁵ Sigal, L. (1998), Jimmy Carter makes a deal. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54 (1), 40-46.

⁶⁶ During the negotiations, the United States promised to move toward normalized economic and diplomatic relations and assured the DPRK that it would provide assistance with the construction of proliferation-resistant light-water reactors to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors.

DPRK to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities. The DPRK also allowed the IAEA to verify compliance through “special inspections” and agreed to allow 8,000 spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to be removed to a third country. In return, the DPRK would receive two light-water reactors and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the LWRs, which would be financed and constructed through the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On 28 November 1994, the IAEA announced that it had confirmed that construction was halted at the DPRK’s Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear facilities, and these facilities would no longer be operational. On 9 March 1995, a multinational consortium, KEDO (Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization) was formed in New York, in which the United States, South Korea, and Japan would serve as original members of the organization.⁶⁷

The Lessons: Origin of the 1994 Nuclear Crisis from the Third Side Perspective

The 1994 nuclear crisis has been known as the DPRK’s “lack of cooperation with the IAEA”⁶⁸ and its unilateral non-compliance with the international non-proliferation treaty. However, the evolutionary conflict stories between the United States and the DPRK reveal that conflict is relational and interactive in nature; conflict is emerged from a unsatisfactory relationship rather than one party’s unilateral breach of contract. It also has demonstrated that conflict is also not only an outcome but also *process* of such troubling relationship. The 1994 nuclear crisis between the United States and the DPRK has shown that why we should take a perspective of “third side” to resolve any conflict.

⁶⁷ Chronology of US-North Korea nuclear and missile diplomacy. *Arms Control Today*. November 2000.

⁶⁸ Asia: War of peace for Korea? *The Economist*, 331 (7868), 18 June 1994, 37.

Skills to listen the other's needs

The analysis of the 1994 nuclear crisis reveals that the crisis could have been prevented before escalated into a destructive conflict, if the United States could try to address its tension with the DPRK directly rather than impose sanction. The surface issues of the dispute was the DPRK's non-compliance with the NPT; however, the underlying causes of conflict lied in their deprivation of basic needs,⁶⁹ which were economic aid and normalization of relationship with the United States in return for the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. Frustration about the deprivation led the DPRK to use violence as legitimate medium to resolve conflict. The latent tension was thus escalated into overt conflict since such basic needs were not addressed.

Further, the DPRK was not offered any means or mechanisms to “channel” their frustration and conflict of interests into possible cooperation with the United States and international organizations, such as IAEA or UN Security Council. Rather, both international organizations excluded the DPRK from the international peace talk. The exclusion from the community led the “terrorist nation” to use their violence to express their frustrated needs. In such conflict situation, the use of international pressure as means to persuade the DPRK was not effective. In managing the conflict situation, both IAEA and UN Security Council only stressed their need to verify the suspicious nuclear sites, rather than identifying the need of the DPRK. Framing the other side as a criminal, who would not comply with the international treaty thus would need a series of internal inspection and punishment, did not produce any desirable outcome.

⁶⁹ Ury, W. (2000a). *Third side*. New York: Penguin, p. 118.

More importantly, the 1994 crisis could have been caught if the United States was able to talk about the latent tensions with the DPRK over the development of nuclear weapons. Instead of attempting to address the concerns and interests of the other side by resuming high-level talks, the United States shut off any intergovernmental channels rejecting any further talk to discuss the issues. Further, the Clinton administration ignored what the DPRK was demanding in return for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. More importantly, the DPRK demonstrated different ways of communicating their need in an implicit and indirect way.⁷⁰ When Carter visited the DPRK, Kim Il Sung told him that he would willingly to resume high-level talks with Washington to resolve the nuclear impasse, indirectly signaling a desire to replace their current nuclear program. Carter later told the media that “I look on this commitment of President Kim Il Sung as being a very important and positive step toward the resolution of this crisis.”⁷¹ Power struggle between US-DPRK over nuclear ownership was not easy to contain. Even at the stage of “overt conflict,” however, it could have been resolved if the “third side” was mobilized to contain power struggle between the United States and the DPRK.

Lack of policy option and domestic political situation.

Domestic political situation of the United States during the summer of 1994 contributed to the escalation of the conflict by pressing the DPRK without giving any other alternative to consider. The Clinton administration also faced political dilemma in which Republicans were demanding further decisive action to prevent proliferation of the

⁷⁰ Each different culture has unique ways of communicating their needs. Thus, reading and interpreting the other side’s desire expressed in an implicit and indirect way would be the major challenge of international dispute resolution.

⁷¹ Bilski, A. (1994). Nuclear poker. *Maclean’s*. 27 June 1994, 22.

nuclear program of the DPRK. Republican-lead Congress demanded to give the DPRK an ultimatum, in which they were sending messages about the removal of the DPRK regime if they would not permit the IAEA monitoring to confirm that no further reprocessing is taking place. Under such domestic power struggle between Democrats and Republicans, Clinton had to take hard-line policy against the DPRK.

Several administrative responses to the dispute with DPRK were made at the end of 1994. The Clinton administration developed its counter-proliferation strategy in 1993,⁷² which was published in the “Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress” in January 1994. Perry argued for a clear public proclamation of the gravity of the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Clinton issued Executive Order 12938 in 14 November 1994, in which he declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Clinton also declared, “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” Clinton also advised the Congress to extend the national emergency declared on 14 November 1995, and extended on 14 November 1995 and 14 November 1996, must continue in effect beyond 14 November 1997.⁷³

The lack of North Korea policy and incompetent skills.

⁷² For the ineffectiveness of the counter-proliferation strategy, see Paul, W. (1994). Clinton’s first year. *Foreign Affairs*. Jan/Feb. 1994.

⁷³ Clinton, W. (Nov. 12, 1997). Message from the President of the United States transmitting notification that the national emergency with respect to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons is to continue in effect beyond November, 14, 1997, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622 (d). Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committee on International Relations of the 105th Congress at the first session and ordered to be printed, U.S. House of Representatives House Doc. 105-169).

The Clinton administration adopted a “crime-and-punishment” approach to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. With its policy, the United States demonstrated reluctance and vacillation in resuming talking with the DPRK. After the Clinton visit to South Korea in July 1993, direct negotiations between the United States and the DPRK were limited to relatively low-level discussions at the UN.⁷⁴ Due to its security strategy that focuses on punishing the DPRK’s transgression, bilateral relation between the United States and the DPPK was deteriorating, since the United States had held no high-level sessions from July 1993 to July 1994 and offered the DPRK no clue for the resumption of a talk. Further, high-level talk between the United States and the DPRK was getting doomed with the indecisiveness of Kim Young Sam’s administration’s position toward North Korea policy: Kim administration was unable to choose between containment by causing the DPRK collapsed and cooperation through the means of economic aids.

Washington’s inability to distinguish between ends and means⁷⁵ was evident in the ways in which the Clinton administration approached to the conflict situation. The Clinton administration’s lack of Korea policy escalated the nuclear dispute between the IAEA and the DPRK by responding with hard-line approach, contributing to further deterioration of relations between the two. The Clinton administration took the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal very seriously as a threat to its national security. Clinton demonstrated his lack of vision in shaping foreign policy. The bilateral high-level talk between the United States and the DPRK was being held at United Nations in New York

⁷⁴ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea’s nuclear program: The Clinton administration’s response. INSS Occasional Paper 3. USAF Institute for National Security Studies.

⁷⁵ Caught red-handed: Confronting Pyongyang is safer than appeasement. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 157 (13), 5.

between 2-11 June and in Geneva between 14-19 July 1993. Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, was negotiating with the DPRK delegate Kang Sok Chu, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an effort to resolve several conflicting issues, such as DPRK's remain in the NPT, adherence to IAEA inspection requests, and resumption of its talk with South Korea concerning denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In the middle of intergovernmental conciliatory contacts, Clinton visited South Korea and made comment on the DPRK as “the scariest place on earth” and excluded the DPRK from his concept of “new Pacific community” in his speech delivered before the South Korean National Assembly on 10 July 1993. When he traveled to the Demilitarized Zone along the 38th parallel, he made even more provocative comment on the DPRK that if the DPRK developed and used nuclear weapon, “we would quickly and overwhelmingly retaliate and it would mean the end of their country as they know it.” The DPRK immediately responded to Clinton's comments that it would be a “rash act” and warned that they would take any proactive measures.⁷⁶ The messages that Clinton was delivering in the middle of negotiations were too overt and offensive to be considered coercion strategy given the contextual situation.

Realizing criticism that Clinton administration created the 1994 crisis, Robert Gallucci, the chief U.S. negotiator who took the charge of the high-level talks between the United States and the DPRK, said:

⁷⁶ Berry, W. (1995). North Korea's nuclear program: The Clinton administration's response. INSS Occasional Paper 3.

It isn't the North Koreans or the United States that make that a big issue...It is how the United States has defined non-proliferation policy for 40 years. You can't violate international safeguards and threaten to pull out of the NPT and have the United States say, 'Well, I don't care.' We had to make a big deal out of that, or you're going to throw over a regime."⁷⁷

The scarcity of contact that cultures prejudiced relationship.

The scarcity of intergovernmental contact between the United States and the DPRK escalated the conflict thus leading to the nuclear impasses, which could have been resolved without leading the situation to the brink of a war. Since the end of Cold War, the United States and the DPRK had not established any official relationships nor had intergovernmental contact before 1997. Although good relationships are key to prevent conflict,⁷⁸ any working relationship between the United States and the DPRK was not established. Such scarcity of intergovernmental contact led the dispute to a destructive impasse. Despite the importance of "good relationship," the United States did not know how to "forge relationships across the lines of conflict."⁷⁹ The United States, further, did not have an intention to normalize its relationship with the DPRK. Rather, the Clinton administration imposed an economic sanction against the DPRK despite their warning that it would be considered the declaration of a war. The United States had engaged in the negotiation process with the DPRK only by forcing and pressing them to give up their nuclear weapon program, instead of giving them a constructive reward by understanding their frustrated needs.

The Clinton administration's lack of North Korea policy contributed to the escalation of conflict into the destructive crisis. Such deficiency was evident in the ways

⁷⁷ Rosegrant, S. & Watkins, M., (1995). Carrots, sticks, and question marks: Negotiating the North Korean nuclear crises. Kennedy School of Government. Working Paper (C-18-95-1299). p. 21.

⁷⁸Ury, W. (2000). Third side. New York: Penguin, p. 116.

in which Robert Gallucci negotiated with the DPRK representatives. Gallucci demonstrated cultural incompetence when he had negotiated and interacted with the North Koreans.⁸⁰ Such internal conflict was manifest in poor communication skills and ineffective management of international dispute, with which the Clinton administration approached to the North Korea nuclear crisis. Gallucci, a NPT expert, misunderstood the DPRK's intention regarding the proliferation of nuclear arms thus forced them to comply with the international agreement rather than negotiating with their incompatible interests. Gallucci's incompetent negotiating styles also created unnecessary tension and escalated conflict by delivering inappropriate bellicose messages to the DPRK.⁸¹

Lack of understanding the other side

The 1994 nuclear crisis could have been prevented if the Clinton administration had analyzed the "needs" and "wants"⁸² of the DPRK. The Clinton administration approached to the crisis situation only with the assumption that the DPRK would have an intention of proliferating nuclear weapons. The trajectory of escalated conflict between the United States and the DPRK, however, indicates that the DPRK had an intention to trade-off their nuclear weapon with the normalization of relationship with the United States. Not realizing the needs of the DPRK led negotiable conflicts into the brink of war. The escalation of conflict also suggests that the United States demonstrate poor conflict management skills and lack of understanding of the other sides' needs and wants.

⁷⁹ Ury, W. (2000). *Third side*. New York: Penguin, p. 116

⁸⁰ For details, see Rosegrant & Watkins (1995).

⁸¹ For more details, see Rosegrant, S. & Watkins, M., (1995). *Carrots, sticks, and question marks: Negotiating the North Korean nuclear crises*. Kennedy School of Government. Working Paper (C-18-95-1299).

⁸² For the construction of "needs" and "wants," see Ury, B., Brett, J. M., & Goldberg, S. B. (1993). *Getting dispute resolved*. Boston. Harvard Business School Press.

The 1994 crisis demonstrated that the DPRK had experienced frustrated needs, which led destructive conflict. For example, the United States' "tit-for-tat" tactics turned out to be disastrous to the other side who culturally values consultation rather than coercion. It was also ineffective strategy for those whose basic need and want--of restructuring devastating economic condition--was ignored and then interpreted only as interest-based conflict--proliferation of nuclear weapon--with the United States.⁸³ Consequently, the United States' lack of knowledge about the "other" side contributed to the escalation of conflict by forcing the other party, who was in deficiency of ontological need, to the edge of lethal conflict through the enforcement of economic sanction. Instead of offering them constructive means of negotiation, the United States chose a political punishment against the DPRK by eliminating the possibility of peace talk, which led the other side in frustration to destructive conflict. Blocking of intergovernmental channels thus transformed the negotiable situation into the brink of war.

Conclusion: Toward the Construction of Third Side

Although several factors involved in the 1994 nuclear crisis, barriers to peace talk have been discussed only in terms of the DPRK's non-compliance to international agreement of non-proliferation. Further, such barriers have been identified only one-party's unilateral attempt to disrupt world peace with the proliferation of nuclear weapon. North Koreans' non-compliant behavior has been defined as "terrorists' attempt" that threatens regional stability in Asian-Pacific and world peace. It also has been identified a major source of conflict that destabilizes peaceful habitat of international community.

⁸³ U.S. Institute of PeaceWatch, June 1997.

Despite the intricacy of relationship in the international community, little attention has been paid to the multiple roles of the neighboring community, which can be activated to prevent the escalation of the crisis or even resolved it by mobilizing itself. Third side approach to resolution of international dispute is thus important due to the multiple roles that can be played in any conflict situation. Third side roles might be mobilized differently across different conflict situations, but third side can be self-organized in that we all can be the third sides to contain conflict. Implication of the third side to the resolution of international dispute is thus important since it requires cultural knowledge in resolving any conflicts between or across national borders.

The problem of the 1994 crisis rests on the fact that peace talk has been discussed with the exclusion of non-cooperative “other” in international community. Rather than including all members of international community, the other side has been stereotyped as a “terrorist” who violates rules of the international community. To prevent reoccurrence of a crisis with the DPRK,⁸⁴ the following questions have to be answered in a critical manner for future study: Was the 1994 nuclear crisis created only by the unilateral non-compliant behavior of the DPRK? Why were multiple-roles of third sides not mobilized to contain power struggle between US-DPRK? Was the intergovernmental dialogue between US-DPRK open and inclusive enough to resolve the nuclear crisis? Had the Clinton administration’s government negotiators have knowledge about constructive conflict management and negotiation skills to deal with the DPRK? How much did the Clinton administration have cultural knowledge about the other side? Are economic

sanctions, the standardized form of punishment for the non-cooperative other, effective enough to produce desirable outcome from an international negotiation? If not, what is the effective means of resolving conflict with the non-cooperative other side?

The crux of the 1994 nuclear crisis rests on the United States' prejudice and discrimination against the non-cooperative other. Further, the United States did not have any intention of negotiating its divergent interests with the non-compliant other. In contrast, the DPRK had been cooperative with the United States by signing the NPT safeguard agreement on 30 January 1992, which was resulted from the continuous high-level talk between US-DPRK. The non-compliant other was cooperative and willingly negotiate their conflict when there was continuous peace talks, whereas the United States accused their madness and rejected for a talk. Members of international community and international organizations also demonstrated extreme distrust and prejudice against the DPRK, only charging them a terrorist nation. If members of international community could have known how much the security and stability of world peace would be paradoxically interdependent with the "terrifying" other,⁸⁵ the third side roles could have been mobilized easily.

There were multiple factors involved in the escalation of the nuclear conflict. First, two major disputing sides emerged after peace talk failed: the United States who claimed itself as a world's superpower, and DPRK who was defined by the United States as a "violent terrorist." Second, two insiders emerged escalating conflict: South Korea

⁸⁴ If the Clinton administration did learn any lessons from the 1994 crisis, had they have to experience another conflict with the DPRK in the 1998 missile crisis?

that had the first and new civilian president did not have a vision of its security relationship with North Korea, and Japan who did not want to see any courtship between the United States and the DPRK. Third, witness or neutrals whose responsibility is to maintain international peace, such transnational organizations as United Nations or IAEA, failed in taking the role of referees to contain power struggle between the United States and the DPRK. The process of transformation of such conflict to a constructive co-existence was not found due to the missing roles of witness.

Further, the scarcity of bilateral contact and shortage of talk between the DPRK and the IAEA escalated conflict and later developed to the lethal crisis. The United States' inadequate handling of the nuclear crisis also contributed to such lethal development. The IAEA should have continued peace talk with the DPRK, rather than inviting the UN Security Council or the United States to the dispute situation. Given the historical distrust developed between the United States and the DPRK since the end of Cold War, a series of peace talk between the DPRK and IAEA was conducted in an inefficient manner. Such distrust of each other also escalated the conflict, in which effective communication did not exist to reach an agreement. More importantly, the use of sanction was not only ineffective but also counterproductive creating further intensified tension and escalating the pre-existing conflict.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ I would argue that nuclear negotiation is a zero-sum game, which the DPRK already realized such merit thus utilized it as bargaining power when negotiating with the most powerful country in the world. With the paradox of the game, the DPRK got what they wanted. How about the United States?

⁸⁶ The study conducted by the Institute for International Economics shows that sanctions deprives the U.S. economy of 25,000 jobs and at least \$15 billion a year in lost business. *Diplomat* May 2001, A10.

How to be a third side?

The 1994 US-DPRK nuclear crisis has shown that any destructive conflict could be resolved if *a* community could be mobilized. Although such sense of the community was not properly mobilized and functioned in the 1994 nuclear crisis, the lesson of the case is that the community can be also constructed through the process of self-empowerment, encompassing the physicality of surrounding neighborhood within an international community. The notion the “third side” is to mobilize a community and share the sense of the community to facilitate prevention and resolution of conflict. According to Ury, third side signifies a “new responsibility,” in which each of us can choose to mediate our own disputes by taking the third side to preserve and construct peace.⁸⁷ Being a third side thus requires new perspective through which we can take the multiple roles of the third side to resolve conflict in a constructive way. The third side perspective is particularly important in resolving international dispute, in which conflict may be easily escalated or intensified due to cultural misunderstanding or lack of knowledge about different negotiation styles or communication skills.

The 1994 US-DPRK crisis reminds of the critical leadership role of the United States not only in mobilizing international community but also resolving international dispute effectively and amicably. If the Clinton administration did learn something out of the nuclear impasse, they would probably have approached differently to the 1998 missile crisis with the DPRK. Why were the same mistakes reiterated, repeated, and reinvented even in a different conflict situation? Each segment of the crisis story narrates that how

⁸⁷ Ury, W. (2000). *Third Side*. New York: Penguin, p. 23.

much the United States and international community have been prejudiced against the “DPRK” and discriminated against the *other* means of different governance, in which the domination of one absolute power, what the western media call “the crazy-czar-regime,” collides with the values of American Democratism.

Regardless of madness of such different regime, negotiation is getting what I want from the other through constructive means of dialogue. It also requires back-and-forth communication to reach an agreement by negotiating each other’s divergent interests.⁸⁸ From the perspective of negotiation, the 1994 nuclear negotiation was a failure. With the prejudice and discrimination against the non-cooperative other, the voices of the other had never been heard. The United States could learn that “negotiation” is getting what *I* want from *others*. With knowledge of effective conflict management skills to deal with a difficult negotiating partner, the United States could focus on what the United States wanted was also interdependent with what the difficult “other’s” wants. To transform conflict to create peace in international community, understanding global diversity and learning appropriate coping skills are crucial for the United States to mobilize all members in the international community. The United States’ policy about the foreign other, therefore, has to be inclusive by incorporating different voices of the other. Only when can the United States learn how to mutually satisfy “our-and-their” different and diversified needs and wants as well, the United States can make any deals successfully.

⁸⁸ Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1980). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in*. New York: Penguin.

Cultural knowledge as self-empowerment

Being *a* third side thus requires conceptual competence. It requires to understand the nature of differences, negotiate divergent interests with different other, and satisfy different cultural expectations of the other side in any dispute situation. In addition, open-mindedness and patience are another requirements to understand cultural and ideological differences of the other side. Most of all, cultural understanding about the other negotiating partners who have different cultural norms and values should be preceded any international peace talk. Being competent about different negotiation styles and different cultural expectation of the other side can provide knowledge, from which any negotiators can be empowered to resolve any dispute in a constructive way.

The purpose of the third side perspective for the resolution of international dispute is to explore constructive means of preservation and maintenance of peace by mobilizing international community. It is a challenging task to be *a* third side, since parties involved in international dispute have different cultural frames through which people interpret a reality. The third side perspective empowers us to resolve dispute in a constructive and peaceful way by being competent with cultural knowledge about the “other.” It creates mutually constructive relationship through cultural understanding and effective dialogue. Such dialogue thus should be continuous and inclusive rather than exclusive or discriminatory against the others who have different set of norms and values.

Third side as means toward co-existence

Being the third side also enables us to see the ways in which a destructive is being constructed. Third side perspective is to challenge the ways disputes were handled based

on mutual respect and understanding. Such different perspective may be achieved through inclusive and constructive way of thinking about the other side at any conflict situations. The constructive means of dispute resolution will begin with viewing-the-world from the other side's different perspective by shifting a self-centered frame to the *other*. By relocating self to the side of the other, both parties can create peace through constructive negotiation. Through understanding and acknowledging differences, we can bridge the gaps with cultural knowledge by *being* the other. Such cognitive competence will empower all of us to see things from *a* third side toward peaceful co-existence of differences.